Naučne polemike i kritike: “Utopian Thought Between Words And Action: Seminar With Raymond Geuss” by Krstić, Predrag
UTOPIAN THOUgHT BETwEEN wOrDS AND ACTION330 │ rAYmOND gEUSS
Predrag Krstić
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory 
University of Belgrade, Serbia
I would, first of all, like to thank Professor Geuss on this rare opportunity – as this 
year marks half of a millennium since the publication of More’s Utopia – to dis-
cuss with him precisely that which he seems to bear witness to better than anyone 
else: the possibility of non-doctrinary utopian thought in an age hostile to uto-
pianism. My questions concern one doubt that is sparked by this commendable 
striving. In such an attempt to provide an apologia for utopia as Geuss’s, the focus 
is understandably on finding a justificatory function for utopian thought, that is 
on the process of ‘extricating’ from it the importance and the mission that it must 
still have for us today: Geuss thus wishes to ‘investigate the way in which wishing, 
hoping, and desiring interact with knowing; to throw light on connections that 
might otherwise escape notice; provide ideal types that can stimulate further think-
ing; serving as a source of useful hypotheses’; and, instead of offering  ‘categories 
of immediate action’ and definite answers, he asks the reader to ‘reflect on such 
things as the socially recognised limits of that which is possible, the consequences 
and conditions of what we desire, the mutability of our needs’. One nevertheless 
gets the impression that the concept of utopian thought is so reductively and, to 
an extent, normatively reformulated that some of the classical, and perhaps equal-
ly valuable, elements of the complex of utopian thought are left out. To put it as a 
question – hasn’t the tradition of utopian thought been significantly impoverished 
precisely by the arguments which have undoubtedly managed to convince us that 
thought can be ‘cleansed’ of utopian elements only at its own peril, but arguments 
which have also reconfigured these elements into some kind of ‘realistic’ utopia or 
hypothetical utopian speculation, into a contextualized utopia, one that no longer 
needs to be closed, complete, stable and immutable, but that is rather linked with 
historical transformations and the development of human needs?
It seems to me that giving up a ‘picture of society in which everything is op-
timally arranged, in every aspect unsurpassably good’, giving up the idea of ‘un-
changing perfection’ doesn’t necessarily mean that we can (or have to) do away 
with one common element that we find in every form of utopian thought – one 
that projects, after all, a certain kind of stasis, resistance to further dynamic, mo-
tion, complexity of the world, that projects an end to ‘bad kind of complications’ 
(that thereby also projects unsurpassability, because there is no further need for 
surpassing) – in other words, the common element which presumes that at least 
some aspect of society is thought of as optimally aranged once and for all. To put 
it more acutely, utopia doesn’t have to be total, it doesn’t have to project a society 
that has solved all its problems, but it can, or has to, think of at least one of them 
as definitely solved. It is my impression that the final argument of the paper “Some 
Varieties of Utopia” refers precisely to this kind of ‘non-comprehensive’ complete-
ness, as well as the example of universal healthcare in “Realism and the Relativity 
of Judgment”. The question, however, remains whether, for example, a picture of 
a world without illness or disease would also count as one such desirable kind of 
utopia? Or that of a world without war, hunger or forced labor? Or whether, on the 
contrary, this would already constitute an unjustifiable step toward the pacification 
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of all tensions that resembles the unfounded ‘utopianism’, in the sense of ‘lack[ing] 
the specification of a mechanism for realising the utopian state’? As it seems to me 
that the latter is true, I would also like to ask: isn’t the contemporary ‘responsible’ 
kind of utopian thought, as one might call it, confined for this reason to the last 
defensive line, to offering merely the examples of minimal and totally ‘realistic’ 
visions? But, to what extent can we still call that ‘utopian’ in any sense of the word 
– and not simply a political program; how much of the ‘utopian’ is left when we 
do away completely with the element of the ‘definite solution’, and why wouldn’t 
we rather speak then, in terms of classical political philosophy, of a ‘political ide-
al’, or even a project of reform?
If this intuition is correct to any degree, wouldn’t we have to exclude from such 
a reduced tradition of ‘desirable’ utopian thought almost all (not incidentally) ‘is-
lands’, except perhaps Bacon’s New Atlantis: the one from Plato’s Critias as well as 
More’s Utopia and even Huxley’s Island? All these visions include – the first one 
in the form of memory, the second as fantasy, the third in a resigned manner as a 
failed attempt – what You rightfully point out: the withdrawal from the world as 
it is, with a specifically utopian fundamental rejection of this world. They see this 
world, however, as shot through precisly with the kind of freedom-negating, un-
worthy social dynamic that the ‘island’ visions should prove to be unnecessary. In 
one inspired paragraph from Minima Moralia, Adorno contrasts the image of the 
linear expansion of productive forces, the increase of production, the never-ending 
creation and growth, the obese voracity, the image of the imperative of expansion, 
of gleichmacherei, the swollen collectivity as the blind frenzy of making – he con-
trasts this image with Maupassant’s vision of ‘lying on the water and watching the 
sky in peace’, of not doing anything, like an animal, of not being anything, ‘with-
out any further designation or accomplishment’. Would such form of resistance to 
the ‘logic of capital’ today be unacceptable, left outside of the scope of justifiable 
visions due to its aspiration to a genuine state of peaceful completeness? Or would 
precisely such vision provide the kind of ‘fertility, suggestiveness and stimulation’ 
that You consider to be constitutive of the ‘right’ kind of utopian thought?
If one were to use strictly philosophical terminology, one could perhaps say that 
You point out carefully the problems of ‘absolutism’, but not of ‘contextualism’: it 
isnt’ clear how the latter manages to avoid arbitrarity, ad hoc judgment and ac-
tion and how it can accomplish more than simply demonstrating the irreducibili-
ty of every nominalized particular situation in its concrete complexity, and how it 
manages not to preclude any kind of ‘principled’ judgment. The attempt to con-
nect ‘realism’ and the aspiration to the impossible is infinitely interesting, inspir-
ing and instructive, nevertheless the fact remains (not only mental but historical as 
well) that realism which pays attention to the context, in its abandoning of trouble-
some universal standards, ends up in some form of conservatism, the standpoints 
of which one wouldn’t exactly call utopian to say the least – quite the contrary. 
Edmund Burke would already be a decent example. In the Preface to Politics and 
Imagination, You reject the idea that Conservative Realpolitik should be contrast-
ed with utopian speculation, arguing that even the deepest kind of political con-
formism and any defense of the status quo require acts of imagining of some kind. 
However, as You lucidly note in the essay ‘Authority: Some Fables’ from A World 
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Without Why, drawing on Hegel, Marx and Freud, the role of the imagination in 
politics has more often been ‘to reinforce the hold of the past over the present’, 
than the ‘production of unrealistic fantasies about a utopian future’. The nostal-
gia for the golden age and its gorgeous landscapes, however, has politically always 
had the function of conserving an idealized origin and, at best, the function of a 
reasonable word of caution to the unbridled optimism of what we usually call the 
utopian projection of a bright future. Since it seems that You in large part accept 
this objection, how does Your dichotomy of realism/moralism relate to the dichot-
omy of political empiricism/rationalism of Talmon and Oakeshott, for example, 
or even with the traditional division between utilitarian and deontological ethics?
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I wish to focus my comments or questions on three relatively interconnected prob-
lems. First, I agree with the idea that we should stop making relatively useless anal-
ogies between utopian thinking and any kind of finite projections or blueprints, 
as well as viewing this form of thinking as something that necessarily has no con-
nection with concrete everyday experience. However, even if we accept Geuss’s 
position that utopian thinking is ultimately a form of posing questions, there still 
remains the issue whether this ‘method’ of questioning (of social practice) is pri-
marily an individual /private or collective/public endeavour. I am not saying that 
we have here some sort of a binary opposition. My question mainly pertains to 
strategy. If we paraphrase the words from the second essay in Geuss’s World with-
out Why: when we are using utopian thinking, do we first need to break down the 
familiar forms of everyday speech (and then perhaps in consequence certain rou-
tine patterns of action and interaction); or do we first need to create positive new 
meanings, ways of speaking and acting, and eventually modes of living?
2. In light of these issues, how do we envision social engagement that would be 
driven by utopias and the role of intellectuals?
3. When this type of non-dogmatic utopian thought eventually generates some 
sort of social action, does its inherent openness imply that utopian social move-
ments cannot have rigid hierarchies or organizational structures? Was the Occupy 
movement in any sense utopian?
Raymond Geuss
May I start with Predrag’s question – you put your finger, of course, on what is the 
really central issue for me. Which is: I want, at the same time, to propound a cer-
tain kind of realism, which means, in some sense, I want to connect all forms of 
thinking with action, and that means I’m going to have to take some existing struc-
tures for granted, that’s what realism to some extent means. I can analyse them in 
various ways, but I have to start from them. And I want to combine that with uto-
pianism, which, whatever it is, doesn’t have that form. And I fully admit that I have 
not gotten very far with that. I do want to make clear in response to something 
you said – I of course do not mean to deny that there can be definitive solutions to 
